www.curacaoproject.eu                      CURACAO - coordination of urban road-user charging organisational issues                   Funded by the EU

Road Pricing Context

OBJECTIVES

SCHEME DESIGN

TECHNOLOGY

BUSINESS SYSTEMS

Prediction

PREDICTION

TRAFFIC EFFECTS

ENVIRONMENT

ECONOMY

EQUITY

Appraisal

APPRAISAL

Decision Making

ACCEPTABILITY

TRANSFERABILITY

Implementation and Evaluation

EVALUATION

IMPLEMENTATION

Case Studies

Bergen

Bologna

Bristol

Cambridge

Durham

Dutch National Case

Edinburgh

London

Manchester

Milan

Nord-Jaeren

Oslo

Rome

Stockholm

The Hague

Trondheim



Urban Road User Charging Online Knowledge Base

Conclusions

During 1992, the first year of operation of the Trondheim toll ring, inbound car traffic through the cordon decreased by 10% during both the high and low charged periods. This decrease in traffic was offset by increases in inbound car traffic in evenings and at weekends. Thus, over the week as a whole, total traffic volumes across the toll ring were virtually unaffected by the charging. For some trip purposes like inbound work-home and home-shopping, there were substantial shifts away from the charged afternoon period to the uncharged evening period.

When charging was terminated at the end of 2005, traffic impacts were in many ways mirror images of the impacts when charging was introduced. Changes in departure times and route choices were the most visible responses to the annulment of charging by car drivers. In general, the Trondheim charge levels were modest, but traffic still displayed sensitivity to tolls.

Model runs show that the removal of charging caused the private car to increase its modal share at the expense of all other modes. If charging had continued, increases in total number of trips would have been more uniformly distributed among travel alternatives.

Some important lessons from the history of the Trondheim charging scheme, adopted from Langmyhr and Sager (1997) and Langmyhr (2001):

  • Road pricing schemes can be hooked up with several interests and objectives which are likely to be negotiated and reinterpreted on several occasions throughout the long and messy policy process, even after implementation.
  • Compromises in the scheme design do not necessarily jeopardise the road pricing rationale or corrupt "rational" transport planning. It seems more fruitful to speak of changed emphasis responding to public attitudes and political preferences.
  • The often formulated ideal of one principal, unambiguous goal as the best way to implement road pricing or congestion pricing is not supported by the Trondheim case. Several objectives have been present, preparing some common ground for agreement and flexibility.
  • Experience from Norway clearly indicate that earmarking of revenues for specific purposes has been of major importance in securing local support for the cordon pricing schemes. 
  • "Immediate" road construction to relieve bottlenecks reduced the unpopularity of user fees. (In addition, user fees have been supplemented by state funds, thus increasing the total amount of investment resources.)


Evidence from Norway indicates that if the range of disbursement purposes becomes wide (i.e., less biased towards road construction), the role of the County Roads Offices as road pricing promoters may be jeopardised. Thus, a strategy for building scheme support through revenue allocation must rest on an assessment of the institutional system, especially an evaluation of which actors may serve as prominent "innovation" promoters.

Read more about Conclusions on these case studies: London | Stockholm | Rome | Oslo | Bristol | The Hague | Durham | Edinburgh | Bologna | Milan | Bergen | Cambridge | Dutch National Case | Manchester | Nord-Jaeren | Trondheim | (List All)